Key Issues

Decision Procedurally Unfair for Substantially Copying and Pasting Prior Decision: Lali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 1245

Facts:

Mr. Lali (“L”) is an Afghan citizen who fled the Taliban from Turkey in 2021, where he has no status. Canadian citizens applied to sponsor him for permanent residence as a Convention refugee. L sought an exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds from the applicable documentation requirements. He argued that it would be unsafe for him to seek the documents from Turkish authorities.

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (“IRCC”) refused the application in 2024. The Federal Court allowed L’s judicial review application because 600 to 700 pages were missing from the certified tribunal record. The Court remitted the matter to IRCC for reconsideration.

On the re-hearing, L filed updated submissions responding that the first decision, including evidence of his treatment by Turkish authorities following his 2024 arrest. IRCC refused his application for a second time on April 22nd, 2025.

L sought judicial review of the second decision, arguing that the officer had copied the earlier 2024 reasons nearly verbatim and had therefore failed to conduct a genuine redetermination. He asked the Court to direct IRCC to grant the application.

Decision:

Application for judicial review granted (Thorne J.). IRCC violated L’s rights to procedural fairness.

The Court applied the test from Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre[1] that there is a strong presumption that a decision maker turned their mind to the issues and decided impartially and independently. Merely copying and pasting parts of a decision, without more, will not rebut this presumption and invalidate a decision. The presumption is displaced, however, where a reasonable person apprised of the circumstances would conclude that the decision-maker did not turn their mind to the issues and decide them impartially and independently.

Here, that threshold was met. The IRCC officer’s copying from the 2024 decision was extremely extensive, covering essentially every decision point, and was largely verbatim. When asked at the hearing, the respondent could identify only one added date and the word “indeed” as meaningful edits. The Court described this as potentially nothing more than “cosmetic wordsmithing”. The Court also rejected the argument that the same submissions would naturally produce similar reasons. Because the first record was incomplete, the two officers did not have the same material before them, and the new submissions aimed at the first decision’s findings went essentially unaddressed.

On remedy, the Court declined to direct the outcome. Substitution is reserved for exceptional circumstances where only one outcome is possible[2] and a humanitarian and compassionate grounds determination is highly discretionary. Instead, the Court remitted the matter to a different officer for redetermination with firm deadlines.

Commentary:

This decision demonstrates the circumstances where recycled reasons on a redetermination can, on their own, amount to a breach of procedural fairness. Here, the Federal Court determined that extensive copying of prior reasons is a procedural fairness issue. This is significant because fairness issues are determined without deference, unlike the deferential reasonableness standard.

The decision does not displace Cojocaru. That is, copying aspects of a decision alone is still not enough to overturn a decision, and the presumption of independence remains a high bar. What Lali adds is a clear illustration of when that presumption gives way: where the copying is near total and verbatim, extends to every decision point rather than background or boilerplate language, and is paired with a failure to engage with new submissions aimed at the earlier findings. A decision-maker need not respond to every argument, but ignoring submissions that target the very findings being copied suggests a clear lack of genuine engagement. It remains to be seen how much fresh analysis will suffice where an officer adopts large portions of a prior decision but meaningfully addresses new material.

For parties, the practical lessons are relatively simple. On redetermination, applicants should respond to the first decision’s findings as precisely as possible, so that any failure to engage with those new submissions is visible. A party seeking to uphold a decision with extensive copying cannot rely on minor edits if those edits are cosmetic.

Finally, even where the court sets aside the decision for extensive copying, applicants should still expect remittal rather than a directed result, particularly in discretionary matters. It may appear unjust to force an applicant to proceed through a third determination after succeeding twice on judicial review. However, the court can minimize this injustice by ordering the redetermination to proceed within firm deadlines.


[1] 2013 SCC 30.

[2] Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at paras. 139-42.

Decision Procedurally Unfair for Substantially Copying and Pasting Prior Decision: Lali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 1245

Ontario Court of Appeal provides “updated framework” for leave to appeal from Divisional Court decisions: Knauff v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2026 ONCA 653

Decision not unreasonable if issue not raised before decision-maker in exact terms: Lennert v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FCA 130

Internal grievance process not an adequate alternative for institutional concerns: Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FC 958

The constitutional guarantee of legality review: Democracy Watch v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28

“Clean Hands” doctrine as basis to withhold remedy, not jurisdictional bar to conducting JR: Benson v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 FC 839

Courts’ discretion to refuse to hear judicial review on equitable grounds is narrow: Sierra Club Canada Foundation v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2026 FCA 110

Lengthy reasons not necessary for a decision to be reasonable: Oleynik v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FC 657

Approval unreasonable if Minister does not interpret the statute, even if decision itself may be defensible: Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FCA 106

Reasonableness may apply when the level of procedural fairness is a matter of statutory interpretation: Cespedes Leon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 669

Charter values and overlapping rights: Guerard v. The Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills, 2026 ONSC 2925

Statutory Interpretation as a Pure Question of Law for Statutory Appeals: Canada (Attorney General) v. Medline Canada Corporation, 2026 FCA 74 

Mandamus can issue without significant prejudice from delay: Benison v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee), 2026 FCA 53

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